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Abstract. The measure problem of cosmology is how to obtain normalized probabilities
of observations from the quantum state of the universe. This is particularly a problem
when eternal inflation leads to a universe of unbounded size so that there are apparently
infinitely many realizations or occurrences of observations of each of many different kinds or
types, making the ratios ambiguous. There is also the danger of domination by Boltzmann
Brains. Here two new Spacetime Average Density (SAD) measures are proposed, Maximal
Average Density (MAD) and Biased Average Density (BAD), for getting a finite number
of observation occurrences by using properties of the Spacetime Average Density (SAD)
of observation occurrences to restrict to finite regions of spacetimes that have a preferred
beginning or bounce hypersurface. These measures avoid Boltzmann brain domination and
appear to give results consistent with other observations that are problematic for other widely
used measures, such as the observation of a positive cosmological constant.
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1 Introduction
Theoretical cosmology is plagued with the measure problem, the problem of how to predict
the probabilities of observations in the universe from the quantum state (or from some other
such input). (See [1] for a fairly recent review, and see the 2014 June 2 Version 1 of this
paper on the arXiv for a list of 245 references that I had found then that seemed to be
related to the measure problem, though it was viewed as editorially inadvisable to include
this excessively long list in the published version of this paper.) This problem is particularly
severe for universes that contain infinitely many observations of each of more than one kind,
for then one has the ambiguity of taking ratios of infinite numbers. However, there is also
the challenge even for large finite universes, because of the failure of Born’s rule [2–5].
A solution to the measure problem should not only be able to give normalized proba-
bilities for observations (that is, normalized so that the sum over all possible observations is
unity, not just the sum over all the possible observations of one observer at one time) but
also make the normalized probabilities of our observations not too small. One can take the
normalized probability of one’s observation as given by some theory as the likelihood of that
theory. (Here a theory includes not only the quantum state but also the rules for getting the
probabilities of observations from it.) Then if one weights the likelihoods of different theories
by the prior probabilities one assigns to them and normalizes the resulting product, one gets
the posterior probabilities of the theories. One would like to find theories, including their
solutions to the measure problem, that give high posterior probabilities.
A major threat to getting high posterior probabilities for theories is the possibility that
they may predict that observations are dominated by those of Boltzmann brains that arise
from thermal and/or vacuum fluctuations [6–36]. Most such Boltzmann brain observations
seem likely to be much more disordered than ours, so if the probabilities of our ordered
observations are diluted by Boltzmann brain observations in theories in which they dominate
the probabilities, that would greatly reduce the likelihood of such theories. Therefore, one
seeks theories with solutions to the measure problem that suppress Boltzmann brains if this
can be done without too great a cost in complexity that would tend to suppress the prior
probabilities assigned to such theories.
Most proposed solutions to the measure problem of cosmology tend to lean toward one
or the other of two extremes. Some, particularly those proposed by Hartle, Hawking, Hertog,
and/or Srednicki [21, 37–52], which often apply the consistent histories or decohering histories
formalism [53–66] to the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal for the quantum state of
the universe [67], tend to suggest that the measure is determined nearly uniquely by the
quantum state (at least if a fairly-unique typicality assumption is made [21, 46, 48]). Others,
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particularly those proposed in the large fraction of papers cited in Version 1 of this paper for
the measure problem that are focused on eternal inflation, tend to suggest that the quantum
state is mostly irrelevant and that the results depend mainly on how the measure is chosen in
the asymptotic future of an eternally inflating spacetime. Here, motivated by considerations
I have expressed previously on Born’s rule [2–5], on connecting observations to the quantum
state [68–75], and on whether observational probabilities can be independent of the quantum
state [76], I shall steer a middle course and suggest that both the quantum state and the
measure are crucial, further suggesting that the measure is dominated by observations not
too late in the spacetime.
If the gross asymptotic behavior of an eternally inflating universe is insensitive to the
details of the quantum state (say other than requiring that the state be within some open set),
then I would think it implausible that the relative probabilities of observations would depend
only on the gross asymptotic behavior of the universe. Therefore, I do not favor measures
that have temporal cutoffs that are eventually taken to infinity and have the property that for
a very large finite cutoff they depend mainly on the properties of the spacetime at very large
times (e.g., times near the cutoff). If there is a time-dependent weighting to the measure, I
suspect that it should not depend mainly on the asymptotic behavior. In particular, I am
sceptical of the specific form of “Assumption 3. Typicality.” of Freivogel [1] that “we are
equally likely to be anywhere consistent with our data . . . [so that with] a finite probability
for eternal inflation, which results in an infinite number of observations, . . . we can ignore
any finite number of observations.” In a footnote to this statement, Freivogel admits, “This
conclusion relies on an assumption about how to implement the typicality assumption when
there is a probability distribution over how many observations occur [5].” In this paper
I shall reject this assumption, which Freivogel notes [1] that I have called “observational
averaging” [5], and instead investigate non-uniform measures over spacetimes that suppress
the asymptotic behavior.
As an example of what I mean, in [77] (see also [2–4, 78] for further discussion and
motivation) I proposed volume averaging instead of volume weighting to avoid divergences
in the measure of Boltzmann brain observations on spatial hypersurfaces as they expand to
become infinitely large. However, summing up over all hypersurfaces still gave a divergence
if that were done by a uniform integral over proper time t and if indeed the proper time goes
to infinity. One could make this integral finite by cutting it off at some finite upper bound to
the proper time, say t∗, but then as t∗ is taken to infinity, asymptotically half of the integral
would be given by times within a factor of two of the temporal cutoff t∗. Therefore, as t∗
is taken to infinity, the relative probabilities will be determined by the asymptotic behavior
of the spacetime. For example, if it were an asymptotically de Sitter spacetime that does
not have bubble nucleation to new hot big bang regions that lead to a sufficiently large
number of ordinary observers, the relative probabilities will apparently be dominated by
Boltzmann brains in the asymptotic de Sitter spacetime. Even if de Sitter keeps nucleating
new big bangs at a sufficient rate for ordinary observers produced by these big bangs to
dominate over Boltzmann brains in the expanding regions that remain asymptotically de
Sitter, if a transition occurs to Minkowski spacetime that cannot nucleate new big bangs,
and if Boltzmann brains can indeed form in the vacuum state in Minkowski spacetime [9,
11, 13, 15, 17, 24, 26, 30, 33, 34, 36], they will eventually dominate over ordinary observers
if the weighting is uniform over proper time up to some cutoff t∗ that is taken to infinity.
Therefore, in [34] I proposed Agnesi weighting, integrating over dt/(1 + t2) (with the
proper time t measured in Planck units) rather than over dt, the uniform integral over proper
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time. In this case the measure will be dominated by finite times even without a cutoff.
Alternatively, if one did continue to use a cutoff t∗, the range of times which dominates the
integral will not grow indefinitely as t∗ is taken to infinity but instead will remain at fixed
finite times (assuming a measure on hypersurfaces that does not diverge as the hypersurfaces
become larger and larger).
When Agnesi weighting [34] is combined with volume averaging [77, 78], it appears to
be statistically consistent with all observations and seems to give much higher likelihoods
than measures using the approaches of Hartle, Hawking, Hertog, and/or Srednicki. It does
not require the unproven hypothesis that bubble nucleation rates for new big bangs are
higher than Boltzmann brain nucleation rates [1, 12, 31, 79, 80], as the most popular eternal
inflation measures require [1]. It also does not lead to measures dominated by observations
of a negative cosmological constant [1, 81, 82], which is contrary to what our observations
give. Therefore, for fitting observations without needing to invoke unproven hypotheses, it
seems to be the best measure proposed so far.
On the other hand, Agnesi weighting is admittedly quite ad hoc, so there is no obvious
reason why it should be right. Ideally one would like to find a measure that is more com-
pellingly elegant and simple and which also gives high likelihoods for theories using it and
also having elegant and simple quantum states. However, since none of us have found such
a measure, it may be worthwhile to investigate other alternatives to Agnesi weighting.
2 Spacetime Average Density (SAD) measures
Here I wish to propose new solutions to the measure problem with a weighted distribution over
variable, rather than fixed, proper-time cutoffs depending on the spacetime average density of
observation occurrences up to the cutoff. The ad hoc weighting function dt/(1+ t2) of Agnesi
weighting will be eliminated, though at the cost of two different rather ad hoc algorithms for
constructing a weighting over proper time to damp the late-time contribution to the measure
for observations.
Let me use the index i to denote the theory Ti, which I take to include not only
the quantum state of the universe but also the rules for getting the probabilities of the
observations from the quantum state. I shall assume that the quantum state given by i
gives, as the expectation value of some positive operator depending upon the spacetime and
perhaps also upon the theory, a relative probability distribution or measure µij for different
quasiclassical inextendible spacetimes Sj , labeled by the index j, that each has definite
occurrences of the observation Ok, labeled by the index k, occurring within the spacetime at
definite location regions that I shall assume are much smaller than the spacetime itself and
so can be idealized to be at points within the spacetime. Because each spacetime includes
definite observation occurrences at definite locations, it is not simply a manifold with a metric
(though it needs to have that as well) but is a spacetime description of all the observation
occurrences within it.
I should note that k labels the complete content of the observation Ok (which is gener-
ically not sufficient to specify uniquely the location of an occurrence of the observation Ok
within a spacetime Sj), so that there can be multiple occurrences of the observation Ok at
different locations within the spacetime. However, since I am assuming that different obser-
vations as such are intrinsically distinguished only by their content and not by their locations,
the probability of an observation Ok given by a theory Ti,
Pik = P (Ok|Ti), (2.1)
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is the total normalized measure for all occurrences of the observation Ok at all the different
locations at which the observation occurs in each spacetime Sj and in all spacetimes Sj given
by the quantum state specified by the theory Ti in which the observation occurs. Besides
specifying the quantum state, a theory Ti must also specify how to get the total measure for
the observation Ok from the quantum state. In the present proposals, I am assuming that
this measure is obtained by a suitably weighted sum (depending on the spacetime Sj that
specifies not only a geometry but also the locations and types of all observation occurrences
within it) of the occurrences of the observation Ok within a spacetime Sj , further weighted
by the measure µij for the spacetime Sj in the quantum state given by the theory Ti, and
then summed over all spacetimes Sj . I shall also assume that the measure µij is a linear
functional of the quantum state, given by the expectation value in the quantum state of a
suitable positive operator for the existence of that spacetime. Then the probability Pik of
the observation Ok given the theory Ti would be the normalized expectation value of some
positive operator (depending upon the operators for the existence of the spacetimes Sj and
upon the weighting for the observation Ok that may occur multiple times within various ones
of these spacetimes), as proposed in my formalism for what I have called Sensible Quantum
Mechanics [69–72, 74] or Mindless Sensationalism [73, 75].
I shall also assume that each such spacetime Sj with positive measure µij in the theories
Ti that I shall be considering is globally hyperbolic with compact Cauchy surfaces and has the
equivalent of an initial compact Cauchy hypersurface, either the Terminally Indecomposable
Future Set (TIFS) [83, 84] of a big bang, or the extremal hypersurface of globally minimum
volume for spacetime with a bounce. Then I shall introduce a time function t that is the
supremum of the absolute value of the proper time of any causal curve from the point where
it is evaluated to this preferred initial hypersurface. Next, evaluate the 4-volume Vj(t) of the
spacetime region, say Rjt, in the spacetime Sj that is within a time t or less of the preferred
initial hypersurface, and the number Njk(t) of occurrences of the observation Ok that occur
within this spacetime region Rjt that are of type k. The sum of the number of occurrences
of all observation types Ok that occur within this spacetime region of spacetime Sj up to
time t is
Nj(t) =
∑
k
Njk(t). (2.2)
A subtlety is the fact that presumably different types of observations Ok have differ-
ent measures as well as different spacetime frequencies of occurring. Therefore, Njk should
not literally be the number of occurrences of the observation Ok, but some sort of weighted
number, weighted by some factor that depends upon the particular observation type Ok [69–
75, 85, 86]. For example, one might suppose that on earth there are far more ant observations
than human observations, but it seems plausible that most human observations have much
greater weight than most ant observations (perhaps correlated with the generally increased
complexity of human observations over ant observations, though I do not know of any unique
obvious detailed form for this correlation). Then the weighted number Njk of human ob-
servations could be greater than that of ant observations, despite the greater number of ant
observations if they were simply counted equally weighted, helping to make it not statistically
surprising why we find ourselves experiencing human observations rather than ant observa-
tions. Henceforth I shall assume that the numbers of occurrences Njk in the spacetime Sj of
the observation Ok, and the total number of occurrences in that spacetime of all observations,
are weighted numbers of occurrences.
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From these quantities, calculate the Spacetime Average Density of occurrences of the
observation Ok of type k for the spacetime region Rjt of 4-volume Vj(t) within time t of the
preferred initial hypersurface in the spacetime Sj ,
n¯jk(t) = Njk(t)/Vj(t). (2.3)
The sum of these over all observation types Ok is the total Spacetime Average Density of all
observation occurrences in the spacetime region Rjt,
n¯j(t) =
∑
k
n¯jk(t) = Nj(t)/Vj(t). (2.4)
I shall call this the SAD of that region, or the SAD function of t for the spacetime Sj .
Now I wish to construct spacetime analogues of spatial volume averaging [77], weighting
each observation Ok by some form of its Spacetime Average Density. The simplest procedure
would appear to be to take the full Spacetime Average Density of each observation Ok over all
of each spacetime Sj and then weight by the quantum measures µij that the theory Ti assigns
to that spacetime. However, if the spacetime extends to arbitrarily large t and asymptotes
in some region that locally approaches the vacuum with a positive density per 4-volume
of Boltzmann brains, the full Spacetime Average Density will be dominated by Boltzmann
brain observations that are presumably nearly all highly disordered. Then the normalized
probabilities of ordered observations such as our own would be very low (having been diluted
by the enormous number of disordered observations Ok that each have similar measures if
made by Boltzmann brains), giving a very low likelihood for such a theory.
One might suppose that if the quantum measure µij in theory Ti for spacetimes Sj with
finite total ages (finite bounds on the proper time t) is not so small, relative to the measure
of spacetimes that last forever, as the ratio of the Spacetime Average Density of ordinary
observers in the finite-age spacetimes to the Spacetime Average Density of Boltzmann brains
in the infinite-age spacetimes, that then when weighted by the Spacetime Average Density of
all observations, the finite-age ones will dominate, giving a cosmic doomsday argument for
a spacetime with a finite total age, as indeed I have previously proposed [87]. However, like
many of the current inflationary universe measures [1, 81, 82], this appears to be dominated
by observations of a negative cosmological constant, contrary to what we see, so in this paper
I shall seek other measures that avoid this problem.
Therefore, I shall seek a weighting over different spacetime regions that avoids domi-
nation by both Boltzmann brains and by a negative cosmological constant. The Spacetime
Average Density over spacetime regions Rjt for certain reasonable values of t that are of the
same order as what is believed to be the present age of our universe, about 14 billion years,
would seem to be dominated by ordinary observations and not by Boltzmann brains, at least
for a suitable quantum state of the universe (though perhaps not for the Hartle-Hawking
no-boundary proposal [67], which seems to predict mostly nearly empty de Sitter spacetime
that would apparently be dominated by Boltzmann brains even for times much shorter than
the time needed for Boltzmann brains to dominate in a universe that starts with a hot big
bang [13]). However, I do not want to introduce some fixed parameter value for what t is
for the spacetime regions Rjt to be used for the Spacetime Average Densities of the various
observations.
Instead, I shall seek a measure to be given in terms of an auxiliary function fij(t),
determined both by the theory Ti and by the spacetime Sj existing within the theory with
– 5 –
J
C
A
P11(2014)038
quantum measure µij , which increases monotonically from 0 to 1 as t ranges from 0 to ∞
within the spacetime Sj . (If t runs only from 0 to tj < ∞ for some spacetimes Sj , I shall
require that fij(t) increase monotonically from 0 to 1 as t increases from 0 to tj and then
stay at 1 for all values of t greater than tj that do not actually occur within the spacetime
Sj , so that for simplicity I can take t running from 0 to ∞ for each spacetime.) I shall then
assume that equal ranges of fij(t) contribute equally to the measure in choosing the value of
t used to cutoff the spacetime.
First I shall explain more explicitly how to use fij(t) to get the measure, and then I
shall postulate different ways (labeled by the index i in the theory Ti that includes not only
the quantum measures µij for the different spacetimes Sj but also the rules for getting the
measure for converting the quantum state to observational probabilities) to get the auxiliary
function fij(t) from the SAD function n¯j(t) for the spacetime Sj . In particular, I shall
propose that the weighted Spacetime Average Density for the occurrences of the observation
Ok in theory Ti and in spacetime Sj with auxiliary function fij(t) is
n¯ijk =
∫
∞
0
dt
dfij
dt
n¯jk(t) =
∫
∞
0
dt
dfij
dt
Njk(t)
Vj(t)
. (2.5)
The weighted Spacetime Average Density in theory Ti and spacetime Sj for all observations
Ok is the sum of this over the k that labels the observations:
n¯ij =
∑
k
n¯ijk =
∫
∞
0
dt
dfij
dt
n¯j(t) =
∫
∞
0
dt
dfij
dt
Nj(t)
Vj(t)
. (2.6)
Next, to include the quantum measure µij that the theory Ti assigns to the spacetime
Sk, I propose that the unnormalized measure or relative probability pik in theory Ti of the
observation Ok is the sum of the weighted Spacetime Average Densities further weighted by
the quantum measures:
pik =
∑
j
µijn¯ijk. (2.7)
Finally, dividing by the normalization factor
pi =
∑
k
pik =
∑
j
µijn¯ij (2.8)
gives the normalized probability in the theory Ti of the observation Ok as
Pik ≡ P (Ok|Ti) = pik
pi
=
∑
j µijn¯ijk∑
j,k µijn¯ijk
. (2.9)
Of course, it remains to be said what different theories Ti give for the way to get the auxiliary
function fij(t) from the SAD function n¯j(t) for the spacetime Sj .
2.1 Maximal Average Density (MAD) measure
First, consider theories Ti that employ what I shall call the Maximal Average Density (MAD)
measure. These make use of the time t∗j that is the value of t that gives the global maximum
value of the SAD function of t for the spacetime Sj , n¯j(t) = Nj(t)/Vj(t), the Spacetime
Average Density of the total occurrences of all observations up to proper time t in the
spacetime Sj . That is, n¯j(t) ≤ n¯j(t∗j) for all t in the spacetime Sj . (For simplicity, I shall
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assume that there is zero quantum measure µij for spacetimes with more than one value of
t∗j at which n¯j(t) attains its global maximum, so that n¯j(t) < n¯j(t∗j) for all t 6= t∗j in all
spacetimes Sj with positive measures.)
In particular, the Maximal Average Density or MAD measure is the one in which
fij(t) = θ(t− t∗j), (2.10)
the Heaviside step function, being 0 for times t before the global maximum for n¯j(t) and
being 1 for times after this global maximum. Then dfij/dt = δ(t − t∗j), a Dirac delta
function centered on the global maximum for n¯j(t) for the spacetime Sj , so eq. (2.5) gives
n¯ijk = n¯jk(t∗j). (2.11)
This then leads to the normalized probability for the observation Ok given a MAD theory Ti
as being
Pik ≡ P (Ok|Ti) =
∑
j µijn¯jk(t∗j)∑
j,k µijn¯jk(t∗j)
. (2.12)
Of course, there is not a unique MAD theory, since for this MAD function fij(t) = θ(t− t∗j),
there are many different MAD theories giving different quantum states and hence different
quantum measures µij for the spacetimes Sj .
One might suppose that a typical inextendible spacetime which gives a large contribution
to the probability Pik in a plausible theory Ti of a typical human observation Ok would have
something like a big bang at small t (though perhaps actually a bounce at t = 0 [88]), a
relatively low density of observation occurrences until a period around t ∼ t0 when planets
heated by stars exist and have a relatively high density of observation occurrences produced
by life on the warm planets (compared with that at any greatly different time), and then a
density of observation occurrences that drops drastically as stars burn out and planets freeze,
until the density of observation occurrences asymptotes to some very tiny but still positive
spacetime density of Boltzmann brain observations. In this case it is plausible to expect that
n¯ij(t) will start very small for small t when the spacetime Sj is too hot for life (and when
life has not had much time to evolve), rise to a maximum at a time t ∼ t0 when planetary
life prevails, and then drop to a very small asymptotic constant when planetary life dies out
and Boltzmann brains dominate.
For example, a mnemonic k = 0 ΛCDM Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker mod-
el [89] with Λ = 3H2
∞
≈ (10 Gyr)−2 ≈ ten square attohertz ≈ 3π/(532400) Planck units (and
so fairly accurately applicable to our universe only after the end of radiation dominance but
here used for all times) gives
Vj(t) ≈ V3 (2/27)H−1∞ x(t) ≡ V3 (2/27)H−1∞ [sinh (3H∞t)− 3H∞t] (2.13)
with V3 the present 3-volume (unknown and perhaps very large because the universe appears
to extend far beyond what we can see of it, though here I shall assume that it is finite) and
x(t) = sinh y(t)− y(t) with y(t) = 3H∞t =
√
3Λ t.
A very crude toy model for the SAD function n¯j(t) for the Spacetime Average Density
of all observations might be
n¯j(t) ∼ A
(
x(t)
1 + x(t)2
+ ǫ
)
, (2.14)
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where A is an unknown constant that parametrizes the peak density of ordinary observations
that are represented by the first term that rises and then falls, and where Aǫ is the much,
much smaller density of Boltzmann brain observations that is crudely assumed to be constant.
(For a Boltzmann brain that is the vacuum fluctuation of a human-sized brain, one might
expect ǫ ∼ 10−1042 [13].) The total number of ordinary observation occurrences in this crude
model is finite, AV3, but the total number of Boltzmann brain observations grows linearly
with the 4-volume Vj(t) = V3 x(t) and hence diverges if indeed t and x(t) go to infinity as
assumed. The SAD function rises from Aǫ at t = 0 and x = 0 (probably an overestimate, as I
would suspect that when the universe is extremely dense, Boltzmann brain production would
be suppressed, but since ǫ ≪ 1 I shall ignore this tiny error, no doubt much smaller than
the error of the crude time-dependent term for the Spacetime Average Density of ordinary
observations) monotonically to A(0.5 + ǫ) at t = t∗j that gives x∗j ≡ x(t∗j) = 1 and then
drops monotonically back to Aǫ at t =∞ that gives x =∞.
Then the MAD measure gives
n¯ij = n¯j(t∗j) = A(0.5 + ǫ). (2.15)
The first term in the sum corresponds to ordinary observations, and the second corresponds to
Boltzmann brain observations. If all the different spacetimes Sj that have positive quantum
measure µij had SAD functions n¯j(t) that were proportional to this one (with the same
ratio of ordinary and Boltzmann brain observations), then the total normalized probability
for Boltzmann brain observations would be only ǫ/(0.5 + ǫ) ≈ 2ǫ ≪ 1. Thus the MAD
measure would solve the Boltzmann brain problem, even for models in which Boltzmann
brain production is faster than the production of new bubble universes and even for models
that asymptote to Minkowski spacetime with its infinite spacetime volume and presumed
positive density per 4-volume of Boltzmann brain observations that would cause Boltzmann
brain domination in most other proposed solutions to the measure problem.
2.2 Biased Average Density (BAD) measure
Next, consider what I shall call the Biased Average Density (BAD) measure. A motivation for
going from MAD to BAD is that the MAD measure does not give any weight to observations
within a spacetime that is after the time t∗j at which the SAD, n¯j(t), is maximized. It
does not seem very plausible that any observation occurrence within a spacetime of positive
measure would contribute zero weight to that kind of observation Ok, so the BAD measure
replaces the MAD measure by a weighting that is positive for all observation occurrences
within an inextendible spacetime (except possibly for a set of measure zero). The auxiliary
function in the BAD measure is given by
fij(t) =
∫ t
0
dt′|dn¯j(t′)/dt′|∫
∞
0
dt′|dn¯j(t′)/dt′|
, (2.16)
which again increases monotonically from 0 at t=0 to 1 at t=∞, but now continuously rather
than suddenly jumping from 0 to 1 as the MAD auxiliary function fij(t) = θ(t− t∗j) does.
In particular, if n¯j(t) increases monotonically from n0 at t = 0 to a single local maximum
(the global maximum) value n∗ at t = t∗j and then decreases monotonically to n∞ at t =∞
(where for now I am suppressing the overbar and j index on n¯j(t) at these three special
times), then
fij(t) = θ(t∗j − t) n¯j(t)− n0
2n∗ − n0 − n∞ + θ(t− t∗j)
2n∗ − n0 − n¯j(t)
2n∗ − n0 − n∞ . (2.17)
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Then eq. (2.6) gives
n¯ij =
2n2
∗
− n2
0
− n2
∞
2(2n∗ − n0 − n∞) . (2.18)
In the case in which n0 = n∞ (as was assumed above in the crude toy model), one gets
n¯ij =
1
2
(n∗ + n0). (2.19)
This is what was assumed above in the crude toy model, which has n0 = n∞ = Aǫ and
n∗ = A(0.5 + ǫ), giving
n¯ij = A(0.25 + ǫ). (2.20)
Again taking the first term in the sum to correspond to ordinary observations and
the second term to correspond to Boltzmann brain observations, and assuming that all the
different spacetimes with positive quantum measure give the same ratio of the first term to the
second term, one gets that the total normalized probability for Boltzmann brain observations
in the BAD measure would be ǫ/(0.25 + ǫ) ≈ 4ǫ ≪ 1, roughly twice what it would be in
the MAD measure but still extremely small. Therefore, both the MAD and BAD measures
would solve the Boltzmann brain problem.
3 Conclusions
One might compare the MAD and BAD measures, which are SAD measures using the Space-
time Average Density, with the Agnesi measure [34], which uses spatial averaging over hy-
persurfaces and a weighting of hypersurfaces by the Agnesi function of time, dt/(1+ t2) with
time t in Planck units. In some ways the MAD and BAD measures appear to have more
complicated algorithms, but they do avoid the use of an explicit ad hoc function of time such
as the Agnesi function, though it is one of the simplest functions that is positive and gives a
finite integral over the real axis.
The weighting factor of the Agnesi measure does favor earlier times or youngness (as
both the MAD and BAD measures do in different ways), but in a fairly weak or light way,
without exponential damping in time. Therefore, it might be called a Utility Giving Light
Youngness (UGLY) measure. As a result, I have now made alternative proposals for measures
that are MAD, BAD, and UGLY. I am still looking for one that is GOOD in a supreme
way of giving a high posterior probability by both giving a likelihood (probability of one’s
observation given the theory that includes the measure) that is not too low (which it seems
that all three of my proposed measures would do with a suitable quantum state, such as
perhaps the Symmetric Bounce state [88]) and giving a prior probability (assumed to be
higher for simpler or more elegant theories) that is not too low (which my measures might
not be in comparison with a yet unknown measure that one might hope could be much simpler
and more elegant). However, if GOOD were interpreted as simply meaning Great Ordinary
Observer Dominance, then since all three of my proposed measures suppress Boltzmann
brains relative to ordinary observers, one could say that the MAD, the BAD, and the UGLY
are all GOOD.
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